

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /031 W  
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O 261259Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7432

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OSLO 4342

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NO, OVIP (FRYDENLUND, KNUT)

SUBJ: VISIT OF NORWEGIAN FOREIGN MINISTER

REF: OSLO 4327

1. FOREIGN MINISTER FRYDENLUND WAS DELIGHTED WHEN I TOLD HIM THAT YOU HAD FOUND TIME TO RECEIVE HIM NEXT WEDNESDAY. I SHARE HIS SATISFACTION FOR THE RATHER DIFFERENT REASON THAT I BELIEVE IT IS IMPORTANT TO EXPOSE THIS VERY WELL-INTENTIONED BUT SOMETIMES FUZZY-THINK, HEART-ON-HIS SLEEVE FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE CLARITY OF YOUR EXPOSITION ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, EARLY ON IN A TERM OF OFFICE WHICH PROMISES TO BE DIFFICULT. FRYDENLUND IS BRIGHT AND APPARENTLY CONVINCED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES. HE IS ALSO AN ARDENT ADMIRER OF YOURS AND HAS TOLD ME THAT HE IS ANXIOUS TO DISCUSS WITH YOU YOUR PHILOSOPHY OF DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, PARTICULARLY AS IT RELATES TO THE MIDDLE EAST, THE FRICTION IN ATLANTIC CONSULTATIONS, AND U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR AND CHINA. WHILE FRYDENLUND WILL, OF COURSE, WISH TO EXPLAIN HIS GOVERNMENT'S VIEWPOINT ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS (NOTABLY ATLANTIC RELATIONS), HE IS COMING IN THE SPIRIT OF THE STUDENT SEEKING GUIDANCE IN A DIFFICULT NEW ASSIGNMENT FROM A RESPECTED PROFESSOR. I BELIEVE A DISCUSSION OF POWER REALITIES AND POLITICAL PRIORITIES COULD HELP CLARIFY FRYDENLUND'S THINKING AND MAKE HIM A MORE WILLING AND PERSUASIVE  
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DEFENDER OF OUR VIEWPOINT. IN TAILORING YOUR REMARKS FOR THEIR MAXIMUM EFFECT, YOU MAY FIND THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ABOUT FRYDENLUND'S ATTITUDES AND CONCERNS OF SOME RELEVANCE.

2. I BELIEVE FRYDENLUND IS CONVINCED OF THE IMPORTANCE OF NATO AND CLOSE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. FOR NORWAY'S SECURITY, AND IS ACCORDINGLY FEELING SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVE AT THE MOMENT ABOUT NORWAY'S ATTITUDE ON VARIOUS ISSUES OF INTEREST TO THE U.S. HE HAS TOLD ME ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AS HE TOLD WALT STOESSEL, THAT HIS FIRST PRIORITY ON ASSUMING OFFICE IN OCTOBER WAS TO WORK TO IMPROVE U.S.-NORWEGIAN RELATIONS. AS A YOUNG LABOR POLITICIAN, HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE LONG-TERM IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LABOR PARTY OF THE GAP WHICH THE RECENT ELECTIONS EXPOSED BETWEEN HIS PARTY AND THE BULK OF THE YOUNGER, GENERALLY MORE RADICAL VOTERS. HE ALSO APPEARS TO BE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRIME MINISTER BRATTELI TO AVOID UNNECESSARY CONFLICT WITH A FAR LEFT ON WHICH THE LABOR PARTY MUST DEPEND FOR SUPPORT FOR ITS DOMESTIC PROGRAMS. HIS PLEDGE IN HIS NOVEMBER 9 STATEMENT TO THE STORTING OF "OPEN AND IMPARTIAL DEBATE...TO SECURE SUPPORT FOR NORWEGIAN FOREIGN POLICY" IS WELCOME TO US PROVIDED GOVERNMENT SPOKESMEN ARE PREPARED TO USE THIS DEBATE TO ELICIT PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR NORWAY'S NATO POLICY AND NOT LET IT PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE LEFT. FRYDENLUND'S ADMONITION THAT LOYALTY TO THE MAIN LINES OF FOREIGN POLICY SHOULD NOT BECOME "DOGMA" AND HIS STATEMENT THAT "YOUTHFUL PROTESTS AND YOUTHFUL IDEALISM CANNOT BY THEMSELVES ALONE SERVE AS A GUIDE TO A COUNTRY'S FOREIGN POLICY" IMPLY A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE WHICH COULD BE DANGEROUS--GIVEN HIS APPARENT LACK OF ANY VERY CLEAR FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OR PHILOSOPHY.

3. FRYDENLUND IS OBVIOUSLY SKILLFUL AT FINDING ARGUMENTS TO MAKE TRADITIONAL POLICIES, E.G. OF COOPERATION WITH THE U.S. AND NATO, MORE PALATABLE TO THE LEFT. HE TOLD THE STORTING, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT NORWAY BENEFITED FROM MEMBERSHIP IN NATO SINCE IT WAS THEREBY ABLE TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEGOTIATION OF EAST-WEST DETENTE. BUT HE EVIDENTLY HOPES THAT RELAXED TENSIONS WILL ALLOW HIM TO CONCENTRATE LESS ON DEFENDING NORWAY'S SECURITY TIES AND MORE ON BUILDING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS LIKE POLLUTION, ATTRACTIVE TO YOUTH.

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WHILE ACKNOWLEDGING POWER RELATIONSHIPS, FRYDENLUND IS SENSITIVE TO NORWAY'S PREFERENCE TO SEEK A RESOLUTION OF ALL CONFLICTS THROUGH THE UNITED NATIONS, AND NOT TO TAKE SIDES. IN ASSERTING NORWAY'S RIGHT TO SPEAK OUT ON CONTROVERSIAL QUESTIONS LIKE GREECE, PORTUGAL, GUINEA-BISSAU AND CHILE, FRYDENLUND IS NOT ONLY THROWING A CHEAP SOP TO THE LEFT, BUT HE IS ALSO DEMONSTRATING A VERY TYPICAL NORWEGIAN CONCERN TO STRIKE A BLOW FOR THE UNDERDOG IN AN UNJUST WORLD. SO LONG AS NORWAY DOES NOT FEEL DIRECTLY THREATENED, NATO SOLIDARITY STANDS LOWER ON ITS SCALE OF PRIORITIES THAN AN ASSERTION OF INDEPENDENCE AND INTEGRITY. THE FOREIGN MINISTER HAS SHOWN A SPECIAL CONCERN FOR DEFINING A ROLE FOR SMALL NATIONS IN THE AGE OF SUPER POWER DIPLOMACY.

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ACTION SS-30

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O 261259Z NOV 73

FM AMEMBASSY OSLO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7433

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 OSLO 4342

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY

4. FRYDENLUND PROBABLY SEES NO REAL CONTRADICTION BETWEEN HIS CONCERN FOR NORWAY'S SECURITY AND HIS ATTACKS ON MILITARY ALLIES--OR BETWEEN NORWAY'S INSISTENCE ON INDEPENDENCE AND ITS SENSE OF MORAL OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHER STATES. UNDERLYING THIS CASUAL DISREGARD FOR THE FEELINGS OF ALLIES ARE SOME MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE NATURE OF SOVIET POLICY, EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND DETENTE WHICH BEG CORRECTION.

5. FRYDENLUND'S APPARENT DETERMINATION TO RAISE THE DIVISIVE ISSUE OF GREECE AND PORTUGAL IN THE NATO MINISTERIAL IS TYPICAL OF THIS NORWEGIAN SENSE OF PRIORITIES. IT ALSO REFLECTS AN EASY ASSUMPTION THAT THE U.S. COULD BRING DEMOCRACY TO GREECE (PORTUGAL OR SPAIN), IF IT ONLY HAD THE WILL. AS WE ARE REPORTING SEPARATELY, FRYDENLUND ALL BUT COMMITTED HIMSELF, IN LAST WEEK'S STORTING DEBATE ON FOREIGN POLICY, TO RAISE THE GREEK ISSUE IN NATO AGAIN. HOPEFULLY HE CAN BE PERSUADED TO DO SO IN THE LEAST CONTROVERSIAL WAY POSSIBLE, AND I AM QUITE PREPARED TO APPROACH HIM WHEN HE RETURNS FROM THE U.S., AS INSTRUCTED IN STATE 23098. I AM SURE, HOWEVER, THAT YOU (OR STOESSEL) WOULD BE MORE SUCCESSFUL IN PUTTING THE PROPOSED GREEK INITIATIVE IN ITS LARGER POLITICAL CONTEXT.

6. SPECIFICALLY, FRYDENLUND NEEDS TO UNDERSTAND MORE CLEARLY THAN HE DOES; THAT DETENTE AS WELL AS THE SECURITY THAT  
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NORWAY SEEKS IS DEPENDENT ON THE PRESERVATION OF A MILITARILY VIABLE AND COOPERATIVE NATO; THAT NATO DISUNITY ENCOURAGED THE USSR AND THE ARABS TO RISK CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST

IN THE RECENT MIDDLE EAST CRISIS; AND THAT WESTERN WEAKNESS COULD MAKE A RETURN TO MORE ASSERTIVE AND DIVISIVE SOVIET TACTICS ATTRACTIVE. HE NEEDS TO ASK HIMSELF WHETHER, AT A TIME OF CRISIS ON THE NORTHERN FLANK, HE WOULD PREFER THE SUPPORT OF A UNITED NATO OR ONE EMASCULATED BY THE EROSION OF ITS SOUTHERN FLANK. HE NEEDS TO PONDER THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER AT A TIME OF WESTERN CUT-BACK, AND THE FRAGILITY OF DETENTE, AND REALIZE THAT NORWAY NEEDS NATO MORE THAN NATO NEEDS NORWAY.

7. A LUTHERAN MISSIONARY STREAK WILL CONTINUE TO PUSH NORWEGIANS TO TILT WITH DISTANT WINDMILLS RATHER THAN CONFRONT THE REAL ISSUES OF NATIONAL IMPORTANCE AT HAND. BUT AT LEAST YOU MAY BE ABLE TO GIVE FRYDENLUND A BROADER VIEW OF NORWAY'S SELF-INTEREST--SO THAT HE SEES MORE CLEARLY THAT COMPROMISE WITH THE LEFT HAS ITS LIMITS AND DANGERS, THAT SEEKING A NATIONAL INSTEAD OF A PURELY SOCIALIST CONSENSUS ON CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES WOULD STRENGTHEN HIS HAND, THAT NATO'S PRIMARY ROLE IS TO PROMOTE SECURITY AND INDEPENDENCE, NOT DEMOCRACY, AND THAT HIS GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO BE MORE RESTRAINED AND SELECTIVE IN ANY ACTIONS IT MAY FEEL CONSTRAINED TO TAKE AGAINST AN ALLIED STATE. PERIPHERAL ISSUES LIKE GREECE OR PRG RECOGNITION SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DAMAGE A CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WHICH REMAINS VERY IMPORTANT FOR THE SECURITY OF BOTH NORWAY AND THE U.S.--AND THE SOONER FRYDENLUND UNDERSTANDS THIS THE BETTER.  
BYRNE

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